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Abstract. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) sys-
tems are computer systems used for monitoring and controlling indus-
trial processes such as power plants and power grid systems, water, gas
and oil distribution systems, production systems for food, cars and other
products.
We propose a new approach for regulating and detecting malicious be-
haviour of network devices in SCADA systems. Our approach consists
of building profiles that describe normal communication between pairs
of devices in the network. Each profile describes four aspects of network
communication: device fingerprint, connectivity pattern, pseudo-protocol
pattern and packet content.
We validate our approach using network traffic from two real-life SCADA
installations.
Problem
In this paper we address two types of threats against SCADA environments: (1)
an unauthorised device connects and start operating (2) an authorised device
starts misbehaving (due to intruder activity or virus infection [2]).
Traditional countermeasures typically address these threats using network
access control mechanisms and intrusion detection systems. We argue that ap-
plying current countermeasures in SCADA environments has limitations due to
the specific character of SCADA networks.
Network access control mechanisms regulate access to network resources and
thus typically address the first type of threats. In practice, network access con-
trol is implemented through a rule-based configuration on network devices to
define legitimate network traffic (based on IP/MAC addresses and port num-
bers). Martinez et al. [3] propose the first behaviour-based network access control
mechanism. The authors use network flow statistics to profile behaviour of de-
vice a in mobile ad hoc network. This approach fails in cases when port number
is (pseudo) random (which is often the case with proprietary protocols both in
and out of the SCADA context). Several authors propose approaches for traffic
classification that do not use port numbers [1, 4].
To address the problem of detecting misbehaviour of authorised devices (the
second type of threats), various intrusion detection systems can be applied. The
most reliable approach for understanding the higher level protocol behaviour is
by using protocol specifications, such as in Bro [5]. However, at the moment of
writing, there are no SCADA protocol parsers publicly available.
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Solution
To address both types of threats, we propose an advanced profiling approach
which is port-independent. Although SCADA systems are complex, we argue
that, compared to “regular” networks, these systems have a less dynamic char-
acter (e.g., systems are half or fully automated, IP addressing is static). Also,
SCADA infrastructures often have several groups of redundant or similar de-
vices within one installation. These devices operate in a similar way and use
the same network protocols (e.g., a plant typically has several PLCs that use
the same protocol and communicate with the same server). Because of this, we
believe that SCADA environments provide good chances for capturing relevant
patterns of communication and characterizing various types of devices and their
behaviours.
Our approach consists of a layered communication behaviour characteriza-
tion. We use network traces from the plant installation to build a graph of
directed communication patterns. For every directed link in the graph, we build
a profile of usual communication. To build the link profile, we use four levels
of characterization: (1) device fingerprint, (2) connectivity pattern, (3) pseudo-
protocol pattern, (4) packet content statistics.
During testing, we compare the current graph profile and the normal profile
to detect anomalous communication of an individual device or between a group
of devices.
Contribution The main contributions of our work are:
– we propose a new approach to profile behaviour of devices using a combina-
tion of four different aspects of communication,
– we propose the first behaviour-based network access control mechanism for
SCADA,
– we perform preliminary experiments with positive results on two real-life
SCADA installations.
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